

National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday 30 November 1983

Top Secret

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
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NICARAGUA: Sandinista Gestures		
Managua is acting to ease internal and external	pressures and to	
indicate its willingness to negotiate with the US.	25.	X 1
Sandinista officials have told the press that 1,20	0 Cuban teachers	
and technicians recently left Nicaragua and that 1,0 advisers would leave this week to remove a pretext		
	25.	X 1
A Cuban agricultural adviser says that some civilian		
leaving but that military personnel will remain.	25X	.1
Meanwhile, Sandinista leaders have relaxed cer		
only opposition newspaper, invited opposition partic suggested they would be willing to issue guarantees	s against	
expropriation if landowners would support the regin offered to allow insurgent defectors to participate in		
reform program.	25.	X 1
Nevertheless, some independent union leaders		
into exile because of increasing harassment. Earlier regime temporarily closed one of the few remaining		
radio stations and confiscated three of its transmitt government also announced it is drafting a law that		
criticism of the regime by Nicaraguans traveling abi		X 1
Comment: The gestures toward the opposition		
broader effort to portray a willingness to take conci US concerns. The Sandinistas also are showing son		
regional peace talks and are ostensibly putting distribution themselves and the Salvadoran insurgents. Although	ance between	
are unwilling to make substantive unilateral concess	sions, they	
evidently expect a response from the US.		X1
The Sandinistas probably have sent home some advisers, but they apparently are taking advantage		
rotation of teachers to suggest a much larger reduc	tion in the Cuban	
presence. They are unlikely to remove any of the es 2,000 military advisers, of whom the Sandinistas an	d President	
Castro have acknowledged only 200.	25.	X1
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Sanitized Copy Approv	red for Release 2011/01/31 : CIA-R	RDP85T01094R000500010030-8	25 X 1
USSR: Timi	ng of Supreme Soviet Session		
Soviet session	comments of Soviet officials sugge on to approve the economic plan a nid-December without the normal a	nd budget for 1984 <u>may</u>	25X1
impending S later than 30 said two we	ions published in 1979 state that a Supreme Soviet session is to be pu 0 days beforehand. An official of the eks ago that a Supreme Soviet se on for mid-December.	ublished "as a rule" not he Central Committee	25 X 1
session wou Central Con special envo after 20 Dec	ek an economist suggested that the last	ollowing a plenum of the Minister Gromyko told a d be able to respond <u>Iinister Tr</u> udeau to meet	25 X 1
uncertain al regulations possible tha so, it is incr	ent: These comments suggest that bout Andropov's health—is using to waive the usual advance notificat the normal notification could be easingly unlikely, because such so	the loophole in the cation. While it still is given in the next day or	25V4
	w Year's holiday.	of this year would violate	25X1

Failure to hold a session before the end of this year would violate the formal requirement that the legislative body meet twice yearly and would tend to confirm to the Soviet public that Andropov is seriously ill. Party rules also require a second Central Committee plenum this year, and the leadership will want to avoid postponing these meetings until 1984.

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
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DENMARK: Debate on INF	
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The mineral content of the	
The minority center-right government of Prime Minister	Schlueter
tomorrow faces another leftist-sponsored resolution opposi	
	25X1
Observers believe the resolution will call on the govern	mant ta
disavow responsibility for INE deployments. The debate is a	ment to
disavow responsibility for INF deployments. The debate is the	ne third on
INF since last spring. It is expected to be the most difficult	for the
staunchly pro-NATO government because the opposition S	Social
Democrats intend to take a tougher position against INF th	an in May
or earlier this month.	25X1
Comment: In the vote tomorrow, Schlueter probably w	vill seek a
compromise that allows the government to stay in power w	/hile
reaffirming its commitment to NATO and the dual-track de-	cision.
Schlueter has vowed to resign rather than abandon the dua	al-track
decision.	25X1
•	
The resolution is likely to be vague enough to allow the	coalition
to preserve its position. If it calls for no INF deployments, h	Owover
Schlueter presumably will stand firm against the majority.	This would
precipitate an election that could return the Social Democra	oto to
power.	25X1
power.	25/1
Neither the government nertice nerthe Casial Dansey	A
Neither the government parties nor the Social Democra	its want an
election at this point. An election probably would return an	anti-INF
parliamentary majority and result in a new government opp	osed to
the dual-track decision. The effect of this break in Alliance	unanimity
could undercut Western security cooperation and efforts to	
USSR toward genuine arms reductions.	25 X 1

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HILIPPINES: Opposition Activities	
The opposition probably is heartened by lar round the country last week, despite the failure naterialize on Monday. Demonstrations are ma resident Marcos to resign, but anti-US themes mall-scale student demonstrations took place lanila and the US Consulate in Cebu yesterday oliday, and opposition groups plan more protexpected to focus on human rights and the economics.	e of a general strike to inly calling for salso are evident. at the US Embassy in the Tomorrow is a local ests, but they are
Comment: The opposition, as a result of its reek, may harden its positions on Marcos's resulticipation in elections. The largest demonstrated by groups that reportedly are heavily communist Party of the Philippines, which accounti-US tone of recent protests. Radical groups to displace the moderates because of the mode gree on a program to capitalize on widespreading government.	ignation and on ations in Manila were penetrated by the unts for the increasing probably will continue erates' inability to
le government.	


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USSR-JAPAN-US: Soviets To Transfer Airliner De	ebris
The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo has offered to tra	anefor additional
unidentified debris recovered from the South Korea	an airliner to US
	peing worked out
and Japanese representatives. Arrangements are b	nofor may take
and Japanese representatives. Arrangements are between the Japanese and the Soviets, and the tra	nsfer may take Japanese officials
and Japanese representatives. Arrangements are between the Japanese and the Soviets, and the traplace on 12 December. In late September US and traveled in a commercial ship to Sakhalin Island to	Japanese officials
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JAMAICA: Government Election Victory Assured

Prime Minister Seaga's Jamaica Labor Party was in effect returned to office yesterday when 46 of its candidates in the general election planned for 15 December were nominated unopposed and thus elected to the 60-member parliament. Opposition candidates filed in five constituencies, while nine have not yet reported. Twelve former members of the parliament were dropped from the ruling party slate to make way for activists loyal to Seaga.

Comment: Seaga is likely to end up with at least as large a majority as the 51-to-9 margin he currently enjoys. He probably will have to contend with charges that he is turning Jamaica into a one-party state. Increasing tension between the moderate and leftwing factions of the People's National Party could cause it to break up into several small parties, with frustrated dissidents turning increasingly to violence.

INTERNATIONAL: Socialists' Disarmament Appeal

Socialist International leaders meeting in Brussels last week appealed for an early resumption of the INF arms control negotiations. They urged a merger or close coordination of the INF and START talks and called for other nuclear powers besides the US and USSR to participate in negotiations to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Willy Brandt, president of the International, emphasized the unanimous support at the meeting for this disarmament appeal.

Comment: Brandt probably was concealing his own disappointment. His West German Social Democrats, who had just gone on record in the Bundestag as opposing INF deployments, had hoped that the resolution would at least urge a delay in missile basing. Most of the other parties favored that idea, but the French and Italian Socialists maintained their longstanding opposition to it. The French are almost alone within the International in their opposition to other nuclear powers joining the Geneva negotiations, and they may interpret that point as having no immediate relevance.

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INTERNATIONAL: Commonwealth Confe	erence			
The 48-nation Commonwealth confer yesterday with the UK dissociating itself f communique. Press reports say British of	rom parts of t	he		
language calling the PLO the "sole and le representative that should be involved on	egitimate'' Pale n an ''equal fo	estinian oting'' in		
negotiations, refused to condemn the rec franchise in South Africa, and agreed only convention on the Law of the Sea would in	y that a widely	accepted ects for peace.		
In addition, Prime Minister Thatcher's ear Prime Minister Gandhi's plan to call an im conference on the need for drastic reform	rlier objections nmediate inter	s scuttled national		

Comment: The Commonwealth is made up overwhelmingly of Third World nations, and Thatcher probably did not expect a communique she could accept totally. Nevertheless, the announcement of reservations was unusual. It probably reflects London's desire to emphasize that its longstanding policies on these issues had not changed.


institutions. Thatcher's objections led to a compromise on a study

group.

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Rafael Caldera

Age 67 . . . served as President from 1969-74 . . . founder and chief theoretician of the Social Christian Party . . . author of numerous works on social and labor law . . . President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and leader in worldwide Christian Democratic movement.

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Jaime Lusinchi

Age 59...longtime functionary and militant of the opposition Democratic Action Party...a consensus candidate...achieved current position primarily through amiability and neutrality...has weak grasp of economic and foreign policy issues...a pediatrician...

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Special Analysis

VENEZUELA: Presidential Election

Democratic Action candidate Jaime Lusinchi maintains a substantial lead in public opinion surveys over former President Rafael Caldera of the governing Social Christian Party and appears well on his way to winning the presidential election on Sunday. Economic problems have dominated the campaign and have severely hampered Caldera's candidacy. The left, which is represented by several faction-ridden parties, probably will win enough seats in the national legislature to keep Democratic Action from gaining an absolute majority. These gains, combined with the left-of-center foreign policy views of Lusinchi's party, will make for significantly less cooperative relationships with the US on regional issues.

The most recent polls show that approximately 15 percentage points separate the two leading contenders, a margin that has varied little over the past year. Caldera's vigorous campaigning, however, should narrow the difference somewhat by election day. Social Christian Party officials believe Caldera's only hope is to win over most of the 24 percent of the voters who are still undecided.

The US Embassy reports that the bitterness between the two camps and the failure of either Lusinchi or Caldera to propose specific solutions to the economic problems have turned many voters against the two centrist parties. The main beneficiary will be the leftist Movement Toward Socialism and its presidential candidate, Teodoro Petkoff, a former guerrilla leader. The Embassy projects that Petkoff could win as much as 10 percent of the popular vote and that his party could control up to 12 percent of the seats in Congress.

Campaign Strategies

As front-runner, Lusinchi owes his position primarily to the current government's economic failures. He has been claiming that already high unemployment and inflation will increase under a second consecutive Social Christian government. In addition, Lusinchi has benefited from the strong support of labor and farmer organizations dominated by Democratic Action.

Lusinchi's chief vulnerability is reflected in charges that he will be unable to deal with the complexities of government because he has never held public office and is inexperienced in economic issues. Moreover, his announced preference for a consensus style of government appears ill suited to the strong leadership that the country needs.

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Caldera has tried to counter Lusinchi's attacks and the public image of the Social Christian Party by exploiting his personal appeal, intellect, and wide experience as a forme and international statesman. He recognizes that his only h turn the election into a referendum on the leadership ques	s great er president ope is to	25X1
Political Prospects		
With Lusinchi the likely winner, the principal remaining will be the margin of his victory and its effects on the cour political life. If the Social Christians are soundly defeated i presidential vote and in the congressional contests, a prot struggle for control of the party is likely.	ntry's n the	25 X 1
A crushing defeat of the Social Christians and major leads of would place unprecedented strain on the traditional stwo-party consensus politics. As a result, Lusinchi might be make some temporary working alliances with Petkoff and gain broad congressional backing early in his administration unpopular economic adjustment measures.	system of be willing to others to	25 X 1
Economic and Foreign Policies		
The refinancing of Venezuela's foreign debt is one of t crucial issues facing the incoming administration. Followin devaluation of last February and the imposition of a multit exchange rate, President Herrera's administration succeed obtaining three moratoriums on the repayment of principal	g the iered d <u>ed in</u>	25 X 1
The last of the moratoriums will expire only a few days new government takes office on 2 February. Lusinchi plans limited austerity measures to gain support from internation	s before the s to impose nal lenders,	
are likely to lift their earlier requirement that Caracas acceprogram before \$18.4 billion in foreign debt can be resche		25 X 1
program before \$10.4 billion in foreign debt can be resone	saalea.	25 X 1
The new government's preoccupation with economic r will limit the attention it can devote to foreign policy. Lusir pronouncements on foreign affairs have been general, noncontroversial, and similar to the nationalist, consensus	nchi's	
of previous administrations.	•	25 X 1
Lusinchi's relative silence on Central American issues when addressing US audiences—reflects his desire to be questions that are volatile at home. He rejects the concep special relationship with the US, and cooperation with Was Central American policy probably will decline. Former Pre Carlos Andres Perez, an aggressive critic of US policy in t could play a dominant role in shaping the party's stance of the mission beginning to the property increase.	cautious on t of a shington on sident he region,	25V4
hemispheric issues.		25 X 1

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